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MQ-8B FIRE SCOUT UAV MANNING COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
At the request of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Task Force, the 
Naval Air Systems Command‘s program office for Multi-Mission Tactical Unmanned Aerial 
Systems (UAS)—also known as PMA-266, began MQ-8B flight operations in Afghanistan. Due 
to the importance and short notice of this request, the initial manning and support measures for 
the Fire Scout detachment has relied heavily on contractors.   
In an effort to refine and redirect the future manning of Fire Scout detachments, PMA-
266 asked the Washington DC Naval Postgraduate School Consulting Group to evaluate three 
different courses of action (COAs) detailing manning options for deployment of the MQ-8B Fire 
Scout for the next year.  The three COAs were:   
1) Manning with a military component 
2) Manning with NGC contract services 
3) Manning through a third party contractor. 
  This report recommends that PMA-266 use the military component COA to the 
maximum extent possible.  In addition to annual cost savings of over $10M, a military 
component provides greater mission-focus and flexibility inherent in a military chain of 
command as compared to a contract manning structure.  The Navy would also benefit by 
obtaining operational UAS experience as it looks to develop an unmanned aviation community.  
The experience gained could be used to develop Navy instructors for operator and maintenance 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
1310 Naval Aviator Designation 
AC Active Duty Component 
AIMD Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Depot 
AOIC Assistant Officer in Charge 
AVO Air Vehicle Operator 
CENTCOM United States Central Command 
COA Course of Action 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
DASN Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
DCC Washington DC NPS Consulting Group 
Det Kunduz Fire Scout Detachment Kunduz, Afghanistan 
FFG 8 USS MCINERNEY 
FFG 40 USS HALYBURTON 
FMV Full Motion Video 
FY Fiscal Year 
HRCAT Human Resource Cost Analysis Tool 
IS Intelligence Specialist 
ISR Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
ISR TF Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Task Force 
LCS Littoral Combat Ship 
MPO Mission Payload Operator 
NAS Naval Air Station 
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command 
NEC Naval Enlisted Code 
NGC Northrop Grumman Corporation 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
OCONUS Outside the Continental United States 
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 
OIC Officer In Charge 
PED Processing, Exploitation & Dissemination 
PC Plane Captain 
PMA-266 Program Office for Multi-Mission Tactical Unmanned Aerial 
Systems Section 266 
QA Quality Assurance 
RA Reserve Affairs 
RC Reserve Component 
SECDEF Secretary of Defense 
SOCOM United States Special Operations Command 
TBD To Be Determined 
UAS Unmanned Aerial System 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
USN United States Navy 
VTUAV Vertical Take-off and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
PMA-266 is located at Naval Air Station (NAS) Patuxent River, MD.  PMA-266 was 
established to manage the development, production, fielding, and sustainment of all persistent 
Vertical Take-off and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) maritime aircraft systems.  
The MQ-8B Fire Scout was the VTUAV adopted by PMA-266 and was designed as a 
complementary intelligence, surveillance, attack, and reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).  Since the LCS program has experienced delays in 
its delivery schedule, naval planners have gone forward with utilizing the MQ-8B on existing 
surface combatants and on shore detachments.  As a result, PMA-266 has supported Fire Scout 
deployments on the USS MCINERNEY (FFG 8) for counter-drug operations, the USS 
HALYBURTON (FFG 40) for counter-piracy support, and future deployments are expected.
i
    
At the request of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Task Force (ISR 
TF), PMA-266 began support for MQ-8B flight operations in Afghanistan as a part of the MQ-
8B‘s expanded role to support land-based detachments.  Due to the importance and short notice 
of this request, the initial manning and support measures for the Fire Scout detachment relied 
heavily on Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) contractor support and manning
ii
.  In an 
effort to refine and direct the future manning of Fire Scout detachments, this report focuses 
specifically on reviewing three different COAs detailing how to man MQ-8B Fire Scout 
deployments in the future.   
This report from the NPS DC Consulting Group (DCC) provided PMA-266 with findings 
and recommendations from a cost benefit analysis of three manning COAs.  The results of this 
report are designed to aid PMA-266 in determining which course of action best meets the 
manning requirements for the Fire Scout detachment in Afghanistan. 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
 In April 2008, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) established the ISR TF to generate 
critical operational ISR capacity in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since its inception, the ISR TF has 
committed over $5B toward rapid acquisition, fielding, and operational integration of vital ISR 
capabilities for forces executing operations.   
 Initially charged with identifying all U.S. military ISR assets worldwide in order to 
allocate a greater share to US Central Command (CENTCOM), the ISR TF took the initiative 
and began acquiring and fielding additional ISR capabilities within significantly reduced 
timelines. While the overarching goal of the ISR TF has remained the same, the primary focus 
has shifted from identifying inefficiencies within the current ISR asset allocation to the 
acquisition of new capabilities focusing on rapid fielding, operational integration, and 
sustainment of new ISR capabilities that can have a direct and immediate impact on combat 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 ISR TF efforts to date have included significant increases in Full Motion Video (FMV), 
signals intelligence (SIGINT), processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED), and 
communications and supporting infrastructure capacity. Most recently, the ISR TF refocused its 
priority efforts to address ISR shortfalls and the rapid buildup of ISR infrastructure in 
Afghanistan while sustaining ISR operations in Iraq. In partnership with CENTCOM and US 
Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the ISR TF addressed a significant number of ISR 
challenges in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
iii
 
 The MQ-8B Fire Scout is a VTUAV and a U.S. Navy program of record.  It is an 
unmanned helicopter designed to operate aboard a new class of ship, the LCS.  Figure 1 shows a 
picture of the vehicle.  The Fire Scout was procured to meet LCS deployments, but delays in the 
LCS program have yielded an opportunity to utilize the Fire Scout for other tasking until LCS 
deploys.  The ISR TF identified the Fire Scout platform as a possible contributor to closing the 
FMV ISR gap in remote regions of Afghanistan that are difficult to reach by manned platforms 
due to the rugged terrain and lack of secure airfields. 
  In April of 2011, NAVAIR's PMA-266 team deployed a detachment of three Fire Scouts 
to Kunduz, Afghanistan (Det Kunduz).  Because NGC is the primary contractor for the MQ-8B 
Fire Scout Program, Det Kunduz is predominately manned by NGC.  Currently, a combined 
military and NGC team operate and maintain the vehicles employed at the site at Det Kunduz.  
 The operational concept for the Fire Scout in support of ISR TF requirements was to 
provide up to 300 hours per month of FMV support to U.S. and Allied ground forces operating in 
the vicinity of Kunduz.  The detachment started flight operations in early May and was fully 
operational on 21 May 2011.  The detachment flew over 300 hours of mission support in June 
and well over 300 hours in July, the first two full months of deployed operations.  Appendix A 











C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
 
 The goal of this project was to provide a cost-benefit analysis of three manning options 
for deployment of the Fire Scout.  Analysis of the three options was designed to provide PMA-
266 with information that would allow them to select the best solution for future manning 
requirements.   
The evaluated options included:  manning with a military component, manning with NGC 
contract services, and manning with third party contractor service.  To determine the advantages 
and disadvantages of each option, DCC answered the following questions: 
 
1. What are the total costs and potential benefits of manning Fire Scout deployments 
with a military component? 
 
2. What are the total costs and benefits of manning Fire Scout deployments with NGC 
contract support? 
 
3. What are the costs and potential benefits of third party contract support?  
D. PROJECT SCOPE 
 DCC‘s data collection, analysis, and results were focused on meeting the objectives of 
this project and on providing actionable recommendations for manning MQ-8B Fire Scout 
deployments.  DCC did not analyze the detachment‘s concept of operations (CONOPS), best 
practices for employment of the Fire Scout and the breakdown of costs of reserve component 
personnel.  Additionally, providing an implementation plan for any of the manning solutions 
was beyond the scope of this project.    
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
 DCC evaluated three COAs which sought to answer certain questions and provide data in 
order to formulate recommendations for PMA-266.  Each COA was thoroughly investigated, 
analyzed, and summarized using the methods outlined in the following sections, broken down by 
COA. 
1.   Military Component Manning (COA 1) 
 While the current detachment utilizes a combination of military personnel and 
civilian contractors, COA 1 was designed to address manning Det Kunduz with the 
maximum number of military personnel.  Once the footprint was determined, the costs 
associated with manning were broken into two categories:  deployment and training.  
Deployment costs were determined largely through the utilization of the Human 
Resources Cost Analysis Tool (HRCAT) program.    
 Assumptions: 
 To determine first the COA 1 footprint, and later the costs of the COA 1 footprint, 
DCC made several assumptions: 
 Initially an all-military footprint would not be possible to adequately fill the 
required billets at this time. (Appendix B) 
 The estimated costs of manning would be the same whether using active 
duty component (AC) or reserve component (RC) personnel.
v
 
 Theater Boots-on-Ground restrictions would not be a limiting factor for a 
detachment size of twenty five or fewer military personnel. 
 Similarly, the HRCAT program operated with its own set of assumptions. 
 Years of service (YOS) for each individual were based on the average YOS 
for that individual‘s particular pay grade. 
 Total costs were provided on an annual basis. 
  Only AC personnel were considered. 
 All costs were figured in 2009 dollars. 
 Personnel costs overseas were based on a generic out of the continental 




To determine the manpower footprint that would be needed for Det Kunduz, DCC 
examined the existing deployment structure and consulted with the program office for 
additional information.  PMA-266 provided slides that delineated the estimated 
requirements for the transition of manning from the current footprint toward a more 
military, less contractor footprint (Appendix C).  Phase II of this report was generated 
with collaboration between PMA-266 and the current detachment leaders in theater and 
was used as the baseline footprint for Det Kunduz.  DCC adjusted this footprint based on 
recommendations from the client to minimize the number of personnel that would be 
required to efficiently man Det Kunduz (Appendix D). 
Once the COA 1 footprint was established, to estimate deployment costs 
associated with this footprint, DCC interviewed Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Ryan, Staff 
Director of Reserve Affairs (RA) for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Reserve Affairs) (DASN (RA)) and Commander Kyle Gatzmeyer, also in RA.  They 
provided basic burdened rates that are used by the Navy in determining manning costs.  
DCC also contacted Douglas DeVault, a budget analyst for the Chief of Naval Personnel 
to refine and verify this data.  The burdened rates from RA were compared to costs that 
were calculated using a program, HRCAT, provided by Mr. DeVault.  The costs 
calculated using HRCAT were more accurate because DCC was able to input specific 
parameters concerning the military billets, such as specialty and pay grade.  For this 




The HRCAT program provided a total annual cost based on pay grade, YOS, 
NEC (enlisted) or designator (officer) and location.  Along with the assumptions inherent 
to HRCAT previously discussed (YOS and location), pay grade selections were made on 
the established COA 1 footprint.  DCC erred on the conservative side when making these 
selections. (Appendix E) 
In addition to being comprised of 20 military personnel, the COA 1 footprint 
includes four civilian contractors.  The deployment costs of these contractors were 
determined by using data from the existing NGC contract. (Appendix F) 
Training Costs 
Training for Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) and Mission Payload Operator (MPO) 
billets is currently conducted at an NGC facility in Hollywood, MD (near NAS Patuxent 
River, MD).  The Navy does not yet have facilities or instructors to conduct training 
within the service.  AVO training is an eight-week syllabus while MPO training is a two- 
week syllabus.  Additionally, vehicle mechanics (airframe and powerplants) training is a 
five-week syllabus and avionics technicians complete a two-week syllabus.  The 
computed costs of these training programs included the following:  salaries during 
training, travel to the training site, per diem (lodging, meals and incidentals) and 
instructor costs.  In all programs, instructors were assumed to be paid at a rate of 
$150/hour for a standard eight-hour workday (Appendix G). 
The training costs of the four contractors were determined by using data from the 
existing NGC contract. (Appendix F) 
2.   Northrop Grumman Manning (COA 2) 
  For the NGC manning method, PMA-266 provided guidance that the leadership 
element of the detachment would remain as uniformed military personnel.  Therefore, 
COA 2 still lists the OIC and AOIC as uniformed military and specifically as designated 
Naval Aviators (1310).  Additionally, DCC determined that intelligence support would 
continue as enlisted Intelligence Specialists (IS).  It would have been feasible to contract 
civilian intelligence analysts but, for the scope of the project, the intel support mirrored 
the current 5 enlisted person complement.  
Assumptions 
 To determine the total costs of COA 2, the following assumptions were made: 
 The contract timeframe would be 1 year. 
 The contract would be a Cost Plus Fixed Fee Contract. 
 The detachment requires 21 contractors and 7 military personnel, similar to 
the current footprint. 
 Military Intel support would be provided by the Office of Naval Intelligence- 
Fleet Intelligence Support Team. 
 The leadership of the detachment would be uniformed military personnel. 
 There would be no cost overruns. 
 O&M contract costs included one week of pre-deployment workup pay. 
 Reach-back services would be a sunk cost and would be required regardless of 
whether the operators are military, NGC contractors, or 3
rd
 party contractors. 
 
 
Data Collection Approach 
 Although the NGC contract has not been finalized, DCC used the proposal from 
NGC as the baseline for analyzing COA 2.  DCC accomplished the following analyses to 
determine the cost of manning Det Kunduz with NGC support: 
 Examined the costs listed in the current NGC contract.vi  
o Coordinated with the program office to obtain a copy of the proposal.  
o Coordinated with NGC and the program office to help translate the 
data. 
o DCC collaborated with PMA-266 current leaders in theater to 
determine the proposed footprint of 7 military members and 21 
contractors.  
 Assessed the current manning structure:  Coordinated with the program office 
to determine the footprint for the military option and contractor option.  
 Examined costs associated with the training and work up periods:  Obtained 
training data from contract.   
 Examined the costs listed in the current NGC contract.  
 Assessed the current manning structure to determine if it was sufficient or 
excessive based on operations to date. 
  Examined costs associated with the training and work up periods. 
 
3.   Third Party Contractor Manning (COA 3) 
This COA focused on the feasibility of using a third party contracting source to 
man Fire Scout detachments.  NGC would still be involved in the training and support of 
the detachment, but would not be the primary source for manning.  As with COA 2, 
detachment leadership and intel support would still be handled by military personnel 
 Assumptions 
 The contract timeframe would be 1 year. 
 There would be a total of 21 contractors for a detachment, including NGC and 
third party contractors. 
 The military Intel support would be provided by the Office of Naval 
Intelligence- Fleet Intelligence Support Team. 
 The overall detachment would be lead by uniformed military. 
 There would be no cost overruns. 
 Any 3rd party contractor can perform same duties as a NGC contractor on the 
detachment. 
 The contract will require on-site support and training from NGC contractors 
for 3
rd
 party contractors and military 
Data Collection Approach 
 Although the NGC contract has not been finalized, DCC used the proposal from 
NGC as a baseline for analyzing NGC contractor costs and Cargo UAS and Scan Eagle 
contracts to estimate 3
rd
 party contractor costs.  DCC accomplished the following 
analyses to determine the cost of manning Det Kunduz with 3
rd
 party contractors and 
NGC support: 
 Examined the costs listed in the current NGC contract. 
o Coordinated with program office to obtain a copy of the proposal.  
o Coordinated with NGC and program office to help translate the data. 
o DCC collaborated with PMA-266 current leaders in theater to 
determine the proposed footprint of 7 military members and 21 total 
contractors.  
 Used NGC required support in the military option as a baseline of required 
NGC support for a 3
rd
 party contractor option. 
 Used the 3rd party contractor annual rate of $822,000 per contractor from the 
Cargo UAS contract. 
 Assessed the current manning structure:  Coordinated with program office to 
determine footprint for the military option and contractor option.  
 Costs associated with the training and work up periods:  Obtained training 
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II. RESULTS 
A. MILITARY COMPONENT MANNING (COA 1) 
1.   Costs  
 The optimal manning footprint for the Fire Scout Det Kunduz is 20 military and 4 
civilian contractor personnel and is shown in Table 1.   Appendix D provides 
amplifying information with additional stated assumptions. 
Table 1 - COA 1 Personnel Composition 
Military Personnel (Rank) 
1 Officer in Charge/AVO (O-5) 
1 Assistant OIC/MPO (O-4) 
5 Intelligence Specialists (4 E-5, E-6) 
2 Air Vehicle Operators (2 O-3) 
2 Mission Payload Operators (2 O-3) 
1 Detachment Chief (E-8) 
2 Quality Assurance Inspectors (E-5, E-6) 
2 Aircraft Mechanics (2 E-5) 
2 Avionics Technicians (2 E-5) 
1 GCS Technician (E-5) 
1 Logs, Records and Supply Technician (E-5) 
 
Civilian Contractors  
1 Aircraft Mechanic 
1 Avionics Technician 
1 GCS Technician 








 The cost for manning Det Kunduz with military component personnel for one 
year is $2,234,707. 
 The cost for additional contractor support at Det Kunduz for one year is 
$2,844,684. 
 The total military and civilian training costs enroute to Det Kunduz for one year 
are $460,095. 
 DCC determined the total costs associated with manning and training this 
detachment for one year at Det Kunduz to be $5,539,485. 
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2.   Qualitative Observations 
While the monetary costs played a significant role in determining the best way 
ahead, other factors also impacted the suitability of the military component COA.  These 
qualitative factors were considered along with the financial data already discussed. 
Advantages 
 The military chain of command structure would govern under COA 1.  Fewer 
civilians in theater would likely present fewer conflicts between the needs 
and desires of the Navy and the needs and desires of the civilian‘s company.  
 The current detachment has cited difficulties with civilians trying to interact 
with other military components on the base.  A mostly-military footprint 
would prevent these issues. 
 Utilizing COA 1 would create and retain valuable skills that will likely be 
required by the Navy for years to come.  Retaining these skills within the 
Navy will likely reduce turnover challenges and increase the implementation 
of lessons learned. Additionally, future dependence on contractors will be 
reduced. 
 COA 1 would provide military experience necessary to implement and 
sustain Navy record-keeping procedures and other administrative needs.  
 The COA 1 structure may allow for future combination of duties to further 
reduce costs by reducing the number of required personnel. 
 The implementation of COA 1 would likely influence the conversion of 
AVO and MPO training from civilian to military.  
 25 
Disadvantages 
 Utilization of COA 1 increases the overall risk associated with the 
implementation and sustainment of an advanced technical support 
detachment.  By utilizing more civilians, the program becomes easier and 
cheaper to terminate if no longer desired in the future. 
 Initial training of instructors will take time before the Navy can fully take 
over for NGC. 
 Fiscal Year (FY) 13, or a best case of mid FY 12, can be expected for the 
Navy to take over MPO training completely. 
 FY 14 is the estimate for the Navy to fully take over AVO training. 
B.  NORTHROP GRUMMAN MANNING (COA 2) 
1.   Costs 
 The optimal NGC manning footprint for the Fire Scout Det Kunduz is 7 military 
and 21 civilian contractor personnel as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 - COA 2 Personnel Composition (Currently in Place)
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 The cost for manning Det Kunduz with NGC contractors for one year is 
$14,934,591. 
 The cost to provide Det Kunduz with military leadership and intel support 
elements for one year is $687,077. 
 The total military and civilian training costs enroute to Det Kunduz for one year 
are $361,337. 
 DCC determined the total costs associated with manning and training this 
detachment for one year at Det Kunduz to be $15,983,005.
vii
 
2.   Qualitative Observations 
While the monetary costs played a significant role in determining the best way 
ahead, other factors also impacted the suitability of the military component COA.  These 
qualitative factors were considered along with the financial data already discussed. 
Advantages 
 Higher technical expertise:  Technicians sent by the contractors would 
potentially have much more training and experience in the field than the two-
week and six-week training courses to which Navy personnel are sent. 
 If licensed FAA-licensed Airframe & Powerplants qualified personnel are 
used, they would possess a wider range of expertise and technical background, 
which could lead to a smaller footprint by using personnel that are cross-
trained. 
 NGC technicians may be able to perform some AIMD and depot level 
maintenance on site. 
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Disadvantages 
 Significantly more expensive. 
 Harder to capture lessons learned. 
 Differences in maintenance and equipment status reporting for the chain of 
command.  Reporting format and method is NGC standard not Navy standard. 
 Existing detachment has observed issues with contractors not following 
expected uniform or conduct regulations. 
 Existing issues with deployed contractors wanting to take leave and little 
support for backfills. 
 Changes in the deployment infrastructure may affect the contracting costs.  
For example, changes in the base security contract caused insurance rates to 
increase for NGC; therefore, fees increased for using contractors. 
 Contractors only perform work as outlined in their contract.  They may be 
unwilling or unable to assist in base operations or with other tasks not 
specified in the contract. 
 The USN is better at conducting operations than writing contracts; therefore, a 
poorly written contract may present limitations in mission accomplishment. 
 Unit cohesion is not as prevalent with contractors. 
C. THIRD PARTY MANNING (COA 3)  
1.   Costs  
 The optimal third party contractor manning footprint for the Fire Scout Det 
Kunduz is 7 military and 21 civilian contractor personnel as shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3 - COA 3 Personnel Composition 
 
 The cost for manning Det Kunduz with third party contractors for one year is 
$10,686,000. 
 The cost for manning Det Kunduz with NGC contractors for one year is 
$5,689,368. 
 The cost to provide Det Kunduz with military leadership and intel support 
elements for one year is $687,077. 
 The total military and civilian training costs enroute to Det Kunduz for one year 
are $486,713. 
 DCC determined the total costs associated with manning and training this 
detachment for one year at Det Kunduz to be: $17,549,158. 
 
2.   Qualitative Observations 
While the monetary costs played a significant role in determining the best way 
ahead, other factors also impacted the suitability of the military component COA.  These 
qualitative factors were considered along with the financial data already discussed. 
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Advantages 
 NGC typically has not provided long-term manning solutions; it has not been 
their core business. 
 NGC would not have to pull trainers to support deployments 
Disadvantages 
 Increasingly difficult to capture lessons learned between 3rd party contractor, 
NGC, and military personnel. 
 Maintenance and equipment status reporting would become more difficult for 
the chain of command to access. Reporting format and method is NGC 
standard not Navy standard.  Further complicated by 3
rd
 party interaction. 
 As previously established, the Navy is better at conducting operations than 
writing contracts; therefore, having two different contracts with two 
companies which need to be partners adds an additional risk at being able to 
accomplish the mission.  
Summary 
Figure 2 and Table 4 on the next page provide a summary of results by COA for 






    Figure 2 - Summary of Manning Costs 
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III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS  
1.    Military Component Manning (COA 1) 
Cost:   
Considering total manning costs, COA 1 would be the most cost effective 
solution.  COA 1 provides a total cost savings of $10 million compared to COA 2 and a 
savings of $12 million when compared to COA 3. Training costs for COA 2 are slightly 
($100K) lower and offer the only cost advantage versus COA 1.  However those savings 
are insignificant when manpower costs are compared.   
All costs would be incurred on an annual basis.  Personnel costs are unavoidable 
and necessary for the detachment to function.  Training costs would likewise be a 
recurring cost for all COAs in the short term.  Some savings could be realized if 
personnel are redeployed, but those savings would be small—training costs are less than 
10% of total costs. 
Technical:   
For the term of the proposed contract, COA 1 would provide less capability than 
COA 2.  COA 1 requires training of military personnel to work on a platform that is new 
to them.  Although military personnel would go through training provided by NGC, the 
shared expertise would not be as strong as using COA 2.  The technical capabilities 
would be similar to those of a COA 3 manning force, which would also have to go 
through a similar training pipeline. 
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Organizational Structure:   
There are many benefits of having primarily a military chain of command.  The 
mission would not be limited by the bounds of a contract.  In addition, the footprint 
would be smaller with only 24 personnel vice 28.  The military personnel would gain 
UAS experience that could be leveraged as the Navy looks to expand the use of 
unmanned systems in its core mission sets. 
2.   Northrop Grumman Manning (COA 2) 
Cost:   
The total manning costs of COA 2 is significantly higher than the COA 1 
solution.  COA 2 is $10 million more expensive than COA 1, but $1.7 million more cost-
effective than COA 3. Training costs are $98,757 less expensive for COA 2 and $125,376 
less expensive than COA 3.    
Technical:   
COA 2 would provide the most technical expertise to the detachment.  Since NGC 
is the primary contractor, they have resources and personal experience that neither 
current Navy manning nor a third party contractor can provide. 
Organizational Structure:   
For example, issues have arisen from contractors performing all mission and 
maintenance functions.  A ground control station was allowed to remain in a down status 
for months since the other one was functioning adequately.  This would not have been 
acceptable for Navy maintenance reporting procedures.  Additionally, reports from Det 
Kunduz and PMA-266 indicated that preventative maintenance on support equipment 
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was not being completed and logged appropriately.  This culminated in frequent 
problems with detachment air conditioning and electrical generator systems. 
3.   Third Party Manning (COA 3) 
Cost:   
The total manning costs of COA 3 make it the most expensive option.  Total costs 
for third party contract support is over three times the cost of the military component 
option.  This COA does not provide any area of cost-savings and is over 10% more 
expensive than the NGC option. 
Technical:   
 Technical capabilities for COA 3 would be similar to those of a COA 1 manning 
force, which would also have to go through a similar training pipeline.  COA 3 requires 
training of military and civilian personnel to work on a platform that is new to them, and 
the shared expertise of the NGC personnel in COA 2 would be lost.   
Organizational Structure:   
DCC expects that using COA 3 would create the highest potential for confusion 
with a chain of command since there would be a hybrid of personnel including military, 
NGC contractors, and a third party.  In addition, the contracts between contracting 
companies may be different and potentially may lead to more conflicts between personnel 






 DCC recommends using COA 1 (Military Component) as the manning option for MQ-8B 
flight operations in Afghanistan. COA 1 is the most cost effective option, providing over $10M 
in savings when compared to the more expensive contractor manning options.  In addition, a 
predominantly military detachment provides numerous benefits such as: 
 Military personnel support only the mission from chain of command—contractors 
support mission and company 
 Provides Navy personnel with UAS experience base 
 Greater flexibility—surge beyond contract specifications as needed 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Though beyond the scope of this project, DCC Consulting encountered numerous related 
issues and would recommend the following issues below for further study and consideration: 
1.   Personnel Sourcing:   
PMA-266 should evaluate the use of a reservist detachment augmented by an active duty 
component.   Both reserve and active duty career paths should be considered as the Navy takes 
steps to establish a UAV community and associated career path.  The UAV community could 
then directly detail members under Permanent Change of Station orders versus short to no-notice 
Individual Augmentation orders.  Also, a pipeline could be created as a means to generate and 
maintain corporate knowledge of the Fire Scout for best practices in training, operations and 
maintenance. 
2.   Footprint:   
 Using designated aviators to operate the Fires Scout is one option.   Switching to enlisted 
AVOs and MPOs may be a means of establishing a more cost-effective method of operating an 
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unmanned aircraft.  Other communities are already using enlisted personnel to operate unmanned 
systems.   
Another recommendation regarding detachment footprint would be to evaluate what 
operational, intelligence, and maintenance resources would be necessary to increase mission 
support beyond 300 hours per month.  PMA-266 and Det Kunduz have already indicated that the 
demand for more capacity exists. 
3.   Ship Applications:   
  The lack of skill sets by uniformed IT professionals in the Navy precipitates the use of 
NGC and third party contractors to provide this support in the near-term. The Navy should 
analyze methods to close the skills gap in for maintenance of UAS Ground Control Stations by 
active duty Navy personnel.  This would require proficiency in hardware, software, and 



































































































































For Official Use Only – Not Authorized for Public Release 
ISR TF Afghanistan Mission 
• To provide 300 hours of Full Motion Video in the CENTCOM AOR 
supporting US Army and Coalition Forces 
• Government Owned, 
Contractor Operated Structure 
– Hardware 
• 3 Aircraft, 2 GCS, PUK, Shelter 
– Personnel  
• 26 Contractors and 7 Military 
– Location 




APPENDIX B:  INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
The following topics were discussed during interviews that were used to gather information 
regarding manning for Fire Scout detachments: 
 
 Minimum required personnel to support operations 
 Advantages and disadvantages of military versus contractor detachments 
 Minimum requirements for military and contractor required functions 
 Methods of sourcing requirements with reservists 
 Training requirements and duration 
 Are there any barriers to success for any of the 3 COAs? 
 
These topics were discussed with the following stakeholders: 
 Current detachment leadership 
 PMA-266 
 ISR TF 
 NAVAIR contracting experts 













APPENDIX D:  PROPOSED MILITARY COMPONENT FOOTPRINT
Military Personnel (Rank) 
 1 Officer in Charge/AVO (O5) 
 1 Assistant OIC/MPO (O4) 
 5 Intelligence Specialists (4xE5, E6) 
 2 Air Vehicle Operators (2xO3) 
 2 Mission Payload Operators (2xO3) 
 1 Detachment Chief (E8) 
 2 Quality Assurance Inspector (E5, E6) 
 2 Aircraft Mechanics (2xE5) 
 2 Avionics Technicians (2xE5) 
 1 GCS Technician (E5) 
 1 Logs, Records and Supply Technician (E5) 
 
Civilian Contractors  
 1 Aircraft Mechanic 
 1 Avionics Technician 
 1 GCS Technician 








DCC made assumptions regarding the best make up of ratings and ranks for the detachment.  In 
cases where the rank did not matter, i.e. the difference between an E-4 and E-5 Intelligence 
Specialist, the higher rank/cost was chosen to show the highest likely cost of the COA. 
 
 The OIC was combined with one of the PMA-266-requested AVO billets to reduce the 
number of personnel required. 
 
 The AOIC was combined with one of the PMA-266-requested MPO billets to reduce the 
number of personnel required. 
 
 All contractor billets were converted to military billets as DON was able to fulfill.  
Mechs, Techs, GCS Techs, and logs and records required at least 1 NGC contractor to 
ensure NGC representation.  Also, DON would not initially have the capability to 
completely take over these billets. 
 
 The command rank structure was determined as a representative chain of command.  E-5 
was chosen as the main enlisted rank because of the time required to train and prepare 
Intel Specialists for a detachment.  The norm would be that an IS would reach E-5 prior 
to being fully operationally ready.  Also, E-5 was a cost wise average of the enlisted 
ranks requested by PMA-266, and fit into the rank structure that included a Det Chief. 
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APPENDIX F:  COA 1 MANNING COSTS 
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APPENDIX G:  FIRE SCOUT TRAINING COSTS 
AVO - 6 weeks O5 O3 O3 Total 
Salary (2mos.) $30,126 $38,476 $38,476 $107,077 
Travel $500 $500 $500 $1,500 
Per Diem $6,846 $6,846 $6,846 $20,538 
Instructor  $72,000/class (150/hr, 40 hour wk, 2 instr) $72,000 
MPO - 2 weeks O5 O3 O3 Total 
Salary (1 mos.) $15,063 $19,238 $19,238 $53,539 
Travel $500 $500 $500 $1,500 
Per Diem $2,282 $2,282 $2,282 $6,846 
Instructor  $12,000/class $12,000 
Mech - 5 weeks E6 E5 E5 Total 
Salary (2 mos.) $13,827 $12,576 $12,576 $38,979 
Travel $500 $500 $500 $1,500 
Per Diem $5,705 $5,705 $5,705 $17,115 
Instructor  $30,000/class $30,000 
Avionics Tech - 2 weeks E5 E5 E5 Total 
Salary (1 mo.) $6,288 $6,288 $6,288 $18,864 
Travel $500 $500 $500 $1,500 
Per Diem $2,282 $2,282 $2,282 $6,846 
Instructor  $12,000/class $12,000 



















 None Intel QA AM AE AZ 
E-3 $54,451      
E-4 $58,842 $62,044  $60,922 $61,928 $61,851 
E-5 $66,666 $66,666 $66,666 $66,666 $66,666 $66,666 
E-6 $76,649 $76,649 $76,649 $87,899 $76,649 $76,649 
E-7 $87,651      
E-8 $96,516      
E-9 $115,050      
       
  NA NFO SWO Sub  
 None 1310 1320 1110 1120  
O-2 $101,641 $202,338 $163,878 $133,935 $162,042  
O-3 $118,893 $225,134 $201,674 $180,404 $189,363  
O-4 $140,865 173,665 $148,665 $160,738 $182,873  







$654,745 per man for total cost for entire contract.  
$642,469 
per man for pre-deployment and deployment (13.25 
months) 
$12,276 per man for training 
  
If you want to keep it at a cost of 1 year 
comparison: 
$586,111 per man for 1 year plus the readiness pay.  
$12,276 per man for training  





 Party Training Costs 
 
 
A contract includes ―Training for Internal Personnel‖.  To determine the estimated training costs 
for contractors, the Cargo UAS manning contract was used in comparison. The Cargo UAS 
contract included a support detachment for 25 people. DCC used a contractor per support 
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